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ABSTRACT This paper proposes a number of theorems and algorithms for the Chinese Remainder Theorem,
which is used to solve a system of linear congruences, and the extended Rabin cryptosystem, which accepts
a key composed of an arbitrary finite number of distinct primes. This paper further proposes methods to
relax the condition on the primes with trade-offs in the time complexity. The proposed algorithms can be
used to provide ciphertext indistinguishability. Finally, this paper conducts extensive experimental analysis
on six large data sets. The experimental results show that the proposed algorithms are asymptotically tight to
the existing decryption algorithm in the Rabin cryptosystem with the key composed of two distinct primes
while maintaining increased generality.
INDEX TERMS Algorithms, cryptography, Rabin cryptosystem.
I. INTRODUCTION
TheChinese Remainder Theoremwas first proposed by Sunzi
in the third century, although the complete theorem was
given in year 1247 by Qin [1]. The theorem has been widely
applied in many fields including cryptography, signal pro-
cessing, vehicular technology, communications, etc. [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6].
This paper proposes a number of theorems and algorithms
to deal with the extended Rabin cryptosystem and quadratic
residue problem, which is formally stated as follows: LetN be
the set of all positive integers. The quadratic residue problem
is to find x, where x2 ≡ a (mod n), a, n ∈ N. Solving
this problem involves a certain amount of nontrivial math-
ematics. When n is the product of two distinct large prime
numbers, the quadratic residue problem is a key challenge
in public key cryptography. Computing the square root of
quadratic residues has applications to Elliptic Curve cryptog-
raphy [7] and the Rabin cryptosystem [8]. In the Rabin cryp-
tosystem, plain-text is encrypted by modular exponentiation.
The decryption process requires taking the square root of a
quadratic residue in two distinct prime modular spaces and
combining the result.
The classical Rabin cryptosystem only considers a prod-
uct of two distinct large primes, p and q, to be its public
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Rasheed Hussain.
key n, where n = pq [8]. The classical Rabin cryptosys-
tem lacks theoretical generality. The Rabin cryptosystem can
be extended through the algorithms proposed in this paper.
The extended Rabin cryptosystem is allowed a public key
n composed of an arbitrary finite number of distinct primes
raised to any natural number powers, n = pt11 p
t2
2 · · · p
tk
k .
This increases the generality of the cryptosystem. Further,
the classical Rabin cryptosystem does not provide ciphertext
indistinguishability. That is, if an eavesdropper knows the
public key n and intercepts the ciphertext c, then perform-
ing encryption on a candidate message m can reveal if c
encodes m. The proposed extended Rabin cryptosystem can
be used to overcome this limitation.
This paper solves the quadratic residue problem modulo n,
where n = pt11 p
t2
2 · · · p
tk
k , using the proposed algorithms.
Furthermore, a generalized algorithm to compute the 2k solu-
tions from the proposed method is developed. The theoretical
and experimental analysis show that the proposed algorithms
are tight to a constant factor of existing algorithms for two
primes, while increasing the generality of the cryptosystem.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
introduces relatedworks on Chinese Remainder Theorem and
the existing methods to solve the square root of quadratic
residues modulo a prime p. Section III describes existing
methods and algorithms necessary to develop the proposed
theorems and algorithms. Section IV proposes a number of
theorems, which can be applied to solving system of linear
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congruences modulo n, and several algorithms based on the
proposed theorems. Section V discusses the protocol to create
ciphertext indistinguishability. Section VI conducts extensive
experimental analysis by comparing the proposed algorithms
with existing algorithms. The proposed theorems and algo-
rithms extend the classical Rabin cryptosystem by allowing
a public key to be the product of arbitrary finite number of
distinct primes. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper and
discusses future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, some existing algorithms are presented to
solve the quadratic residue problem modulo a prime p.
An explanation of the Chinese Remainder Theorem and the
equivalence to a single linear congruence, which is used to
construct the proposed method to solve for quadratic residues
modulo any natural number n.
Over the past 150 years, several algorithms have been
developed to solve the quadratic residue problem modulo
a single prime p. Tonelli in 1891 [9] proposed one of the
first efficient algorithms which was later improved by Shanks
in 1973 [10]. Lindhurst [11] showed that Tonelli’s algorithm
in Fp uses O((log p)3) bit operations on average, when p
and a are chosen at random. Cipolla developed the current
most efficient algorithm which makes use of Field-Theoretic
methods [12]. These algorithms are useful in situations where
no condition on p is given aside from primality. Suppose a
situation arises where x2 ≡ a mod p. To make it a square
on the right hand side, one may use either of these methods,
for which the algorithms are described in Section IV. Faster
algorithms for solving the quadratic residue problem exist
if conditions are added to p. When p ≡ 3 (mod 4), it is
possible to apply Fermat’s Little Theorem in order to solve
the quadratic residue problem [13]. This algorithm has a
time complexity of O(log(b)) which makes it popular for
cryptographic applications.
The quadratic residue problem has applications to some
forms of elliptic curve cryptography. Various protocols exist
for this type of cryptosystem, which can implement encryp-
tion, decryption, and signing operations [14]. In general,
these procedures are computed by evaluating points on an
elliptic curve of the form y2 = x3 + ax + b (mod p) for
some chosen integers a and b which constitutes the Elliptic
Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [14]. In elliptic
curve cryptography, points on the curve are often stored using
point compression [15]. In point compression, a point (x, y)
on the elliptic curve can be stored as (x, β) where β is a single
bit of y. Point decompression, that is, restoring the value of y
from (x, β), requires computing the square root of a quadratic
residue.
The Rabin cryptosystem is one of the most direct crypto-
graphic applications of the quadratic residue problem. This
protocol, published in January 1979 by Rabin, was the first
asymmetric cryptosystem to prove that recovery of the entire
plaintext from the ciphertext is as hard as factoring integers
[8]. In the original method, Rabin introduced x2 ≡ c (mod n),
where c is the ciphertext and n = pq in which p and q are
distinct large primes. One main problem of Rabin cryptosys-
tem is that there are at most four solutions when solving the
quadratic residue problem. Several schemes were developed
to overcome this issue: build redundancy in themessage, send
extra bits, or limit the message size and factors for n [13].
Limiting the message size and the factors for n are dis-
cussed by Takagi [16], Asbullah and Ariffin [17], and Mahad
et al. [18]. Takagi first proposed the scheme which takes n =
p2q, with p and q distinct large primes, with no restriction on
the message size M . Asbullah and Ariffin showed a scheme
which takes n = p2q, for p, q ≡ 3 (mod 4) distinct large
primes and limits the message size M to be M ∈ (0, 22n−2).
Both schemes need to utilize Algorithms 1, 2, or 3 if p, q 6≡
3 (mod 4) or p, q 6≡ 5 (mod 8). If p, q ≡ 3 (mod 4), then
Fermat’s Little Theorem can easily be applied to solve each
congruence.
Other than applying the Chinese Remainder Theorem to
the quadratic residue problem in cryptography, there are
other uses, for example in communication, vehicular tech-
nology, signal processing, and optical security. In the field
of communication, Chen and Lin discussed an energy-
efficient Media Access Control (MAC) address scheme
using the Chinese Remainder Theorem for wireless sen-
sor networks [2]. In the field of vehicular technology,
Wang et al., used the Chinese Remainder Theorem ranging
method based on dual-frequency measurements [4]. Li et al.,
also used a similar method in their phase-detection-based
range estimation [3]. In the field of signal processing, Wang
and Xia used the Chinese Remainder Theorem to perform
analysis on performance [6]. In [5], Wang et al. discussed the
largest dynamic range of a generalized Chinese Remainder
Theorem for two integers. In [19], the authors suggest a
hybrid digital and optical system for the future of fast and
secure cryptography. Optical computing can provide a level
of efficiency not achievable by digital systems alone, but trade
offs in data integrity during decryption create new problems
unique to optical cryptosystems. One approach to optical
cryptosystems is given as a triplet of functions by Yatish et al.
which describes a single function on a plaintext input matrix
to encrypt and two functions to decrypt the ciphertext [20].
The new algorithms proposed in Section IV are applied
to the Rabin cryptosystem for its direct application of the
quadratic residue problem. The algorithms in Section IV
can use any of the below methods to compute the square
root modulo a prime p. It is shown how to generate the
solution to the square root of a quadratic residue modulo
n = pk11 p
k2
2 · · · p
kr
r , which has at most 2r unique solutions.
Classically, the Chinese Remainder Theorem is used to gener-
ate the solutions (x modulo n). The following section presents
existing algorithms to solve the quadratic residue problem
modulo a prime p and describes some existing results on the
Chinese Remainder Theorem. In our experiment, we provide
r less than 9 primes.When r is greater than 8 the computation
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time increases quickly with the current implementation. As a
future work, we are working on a dynamic programming
solution for the scenarios where r is greater than 8. The
proposed algorithms in Section IV are developed from some
extensions of these existing results and algorithms.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Tonelli published the first algorithm in 1893 [9], shown in
Algorithm 1. This is one of the probabilistic algorithms to
compute the quadratic residue modulo p. There is a prob-
ability of at least 1/2 for a random element of Fp to be
a non-square integer. It takes input a from the congruence
x2 ≡ a (mod p) and computes b where b2 = a. The time
complexity of Tonelli’s algorithm is O((logp)4).
Algorithm 1 Tonelli’s Algorithm
Input: a ∈ F∗p, p odd
Output: b =
√
a on F∗p
1: Choose g ∈ F∗p at random
2: if g is a square then
3: return -1
4: end if
5: Let p− 1 = 2st , t odd.
6: e← 0.
7: for i← 2 to s do
8: if (ag−e)(p−1)/2
i
6= 1 then
9: e← 2i−1 + e
10: end if
11: end for
12: h← ag−e
13: b← ge/2h(t+1)/2
14: return b
Cipolla published another algorithm in 1903 [12], shown in
Algorithm 2. This is the current best known algorithm for cal-
culating the square root of a quadratic residuemodulo a prime
p with no restriction on the choice of p. Cipolla’s algorithm
constructs a quadratic extension of Fp, and uses an element
t whose norm N (t) equals a [21]. The time complexity of
Cipolla’s algorithm is O((logp)3).
Algorithm 2 Cipolla’s Algorithm
Input: a ∈ F∗p
Output: b =
√
a on F∗p
Choose t ∈ F∗p at random
if t2 − 4a is a square then
return -1
end if
f ← X2 − tX + a
b← X (p+1)/2 (mod f )
return b
The square root modulo pmay be determined by using the
definition of modulo, b2 = a+ kn, ∃k, n ∈ N, 1 ≤ k ≤
⌊ n
4
⌋
,
as shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm by Exhaustion
Input: a ∈ F∗p
Output: b =
√
a on F∗p
s← a
while s is not a square do
3: s← s+ a
end while
b←
√
s
6: return b
Since the speed of calculating the square root is of high
interest in cryptographic applications and computing in gen-
eral, some constraints may be added to the choice of a prime
p where faster algorithms exist to compute the square root.
The most popular algorithm utilized is the algorithm based
on Fermat’s Little Theorem [13]. The algorithm is given in
Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Algorithm Based on Fermat’s Little Theorem
Input: a ∈ F∗p and p ≡ 3 (mod 4)
Output: b =
√
a on F∗p
b← a
p+1
4 (mod p)
return b
The first theorem presents the classical method for the
Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Theorem 1 (Classical Chinese Remainder Theorem): Let
m1,m2, ...,mr be pairwise relatively prime integers. Then the
simultaneous congruence
x ≡ a1 (mod m1)
x ≡ a2 (mod m2)
...
x ≡ ar (mod mr )
(1.1)
has a unique solution modulo the product m1×m2×· · ·×mr .
Proof: See Appendix A for proof of (1.1) [22].
The next theorem is proposed by Nagasaka et al. [23]. It is
an improvement to the Chinese Remainder Theorem. This
theorem will be the basis for our proposed theorems.
Theorem 2: (Improved Algorithm) Under the same
assumptions as in the Chinese Remainder, the system of
congruences (1.1) is equivalent to the following single linear
congruence.
(
r∑
i=1
biMi)x ≡
r∑
i=1
aibiMi (mod M )
where bi’s are arbitrary integers coprime tomi’s, respectively,
and Mi = M/mi for i = 1, 2, . . . , r with
M =
r∏
i=1
mi
Proof: See Appendix B [23].
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IV. PROPOSED THEORIES AND ALGORITHMS
Before presenting the proposed algorithms, two novel
theorems and corresponding proofs on the Chinese
Remainder Theorem are developed. The result is then
extended to the quadratic residue problem. Finally, five
generalized algorithms are presented based on the proposed
theorems which can be utilized for decryption in the extended
Rabin cryptosystem. The algorithms can be modified to solve
point decompression in an elliptic curve cryptosystem.
Lemma 3: Let a system of linear congruences be given:
x ≡ a1 (mod m1)
x ≡ a2 (mod m2)
...
x ≡ ar (mod mr )
where gcd(mi,mj) = 1, for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ r, i 6= j. Suppose
n∑
i=1
biMi = 1, where gcd(bi,mi) = 1 and Mi =
m1×m2×···×mr
mi
.
Then the system has a unique solution:
x ≡
n∑
i=1
aibiMi (mod M ),
where M = m1 × m2 × · · · × mr .
Proof: From Theorem 1, the system has a unique solu-
tion. From Theorem 2, the system is equivalent to
(
r∑
i=1
biMi)x ≡
r∑
i=1
aibiMi (mod M )
Since
r∑
i=1
biMi = 1, the result follows.
This result is extended to solve the quadratic residue prob-
lem. Theorem 4 solves the general version of the quadratic
residue problem using the linear congruence from Lemma 3
for any n, where 1 ≤ i ≤ r, ki ∈ N, n = pk11 p
k2
2 · · · p
kr
r .
Special cases of Lemma 3which are valuable in cryptography
are given as corollaries.
Theorem 4: Let x2 ≡ a2 (mod n), where n =
pk11 p
k2
2 · · · p
kr
r , p1, ..., pr are distinct primes, and k1,
k2, ..., kr ∈ N. If
r∑
i=1
bi n
p
ki
i
= 1, and (b1, p1) = (b2, p2) =
· · · = (br , pr ) = 1, then there are 2r solutions, which are:
x ≡ a(±b1
n
pk11
± b2
n
pk22
± · · · ± br
n
pkrr
) (mod n)
or equivalently, x ≡ xj1,j2,··· ,jr ≡ a[(−1)
j1 (b1 n
p
k1
1
) +
(−1)j2 (b2 n
p
k2
2
) + · · · + (−1)jr (br npkrr
)] (mod n), jl = 0, 1, for
1 ≤ l ≤ r.
Proof: First, the square root on both sides is taken to
obtain x ≡ ±a (mod n). Then there exists the following
system of congruences:
x ≡ ±a (mod pk11 )
x ≡ ±a (mod pk22 )
...
x ≡ ±a (mod pkrr )
Since
r∑
i=1
bi n
p
ki
i
= 1, Lemma 3 is applied directly. Therefore,
the solutions are:
x ≡ a(±b1
n
pk11
± b2
n
pk22
± · · · ± br
n
pkrr
) (mod n)
or equivalently, x ≡ xj1,j2,··· ,jr ≡ a[(−1)
j1 (b1 n
p
k1
1
) +
(−1)j2 (b2 n
p
k2
2
) + · · · + (−1)jr (br npkrr
)] (mod n), jl = 0, 1, for
1 ≤ l ≤ r .
Following from Theorem 4 are two corollaries. Corollary 5
gives a formula for the solutions of a quadratic residue prob-
lem where n = pk11 p
k2
2 , for which there are four solutions.
Corollary 5: Let x2 ≡ a2 (mod n), where n = pk11 p
k2
2 ,
p1, p2 are distinct primes, and k1, k2 ∈ N.
If b1 n
p
k1
1
+ b2 n
p
k2
2
= 1, where (b1, p1) = (b2, p2) = 1, then
x ≡ a(±b1
n
pk11
± b2
n
pk22
) (mod n)
Similarly, there exists a formula (n = pk11 p
k2
2 p
k3
3 ) for the
solutions of quadratic residue problem for which there are
eight solutions given by Corollary 6.
Corollary 6: Let x2 ≡ a2 (mod n), where n = pk11 p
k2
2 p
k3
3 ,
p1, p2, p3 are distinct primes, and k1, k2, k3 ∈ N.
If b1 n
p
k1
1
+ b2 n
p
k2
2
+ b3 n
p
k3
3
= 1, where (b1, p1) = (b2, p2) =
(b3, p3) = 1, then
x ≡ a(±b1
n
pk11
± b2
n
pk22
± b3
n
pk33
) (mod n)
Given a situation in which the quadratic residue is not in
the form of a perfect square, there exist several methods to
solve x2 ≡ a (mod n) (1), assuming the congruence (1)
is solvable. Lemma 3 requires a perfect square on the right
hand side. However, this can be overcome. Using the prime
factorization of n = pk11 p
k2
2 · · · p
kr
r , Algorithms 1 and 2 can be
applied to solve square roots in Fpi , 1 ≤ i ≤ r , as discussed in
Section III, then an application of Hensel’s lemma [24] can
lift each solution to F
p
ki
i
. Alternatively, Algorithm 3 can be
used to directly find the perfect square or subject to certain
constraints discussed in Section III, Algorithm 4 can be uti-
lized with high performance. Then, the following Theorem,
Theorem 7, will obtain all of the 2r solutions to (1).
Theorem 7: Let x2 ≡ a (mod n), where n = pk11 p
k2
2 · · · p
kr
r ,
p1, ..., pr are distinct primes, and k1, k2, ..., ki ∈ N.
If
r∑
i=1
bi n
p
ki
i
= 1, where (b1, p1) = (b2, p2) = · · · =
(br , pr ) = 1, then there are 2r solutions, which are:
x ≡ ±a1b1
n
pk11
± a2b2
n
pk22
± · · · ± arbr
n
pkrr
(mod n)
where a2i ≡ a (mod p
ki
i ), or equivalently: x ≡
xj1,j2,··· ,jr ≡ (−1)
j1 (a1b1 n
p
k1
1
) + (−1)j2 (a2b2 n
p
k2
2
) + · · · +
(−1)jr (arbr npkrr
) (mod n), jl = 0, 1, for 1 ≤ l ≤ r.
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Proof: First reduce the congruence to the following:
x2 ≡ a (mod pk11 )
x2 ≡ a (mod pk22 )
...
x2 ≡ a (mod pkrr )
After reducing modulo pkii in each congruence, the system
becomes: 
x2 ≡ c1 (mod p
k1
1 )
x2 ≡ c2 (mod p
k2
2 )
...
x2 ≡ cr (mod p
kr
r )
Note that reducing modulo pkii is not necessary. To obtain a
square on the right hand side, any of the methods presented
in Section III can be utilized. Let a2i ≡ ci (mod p
ki
i ), then the
system becomes: 
x2 ≡ a21 (mod p
k1
1 )
x2 ≡ a22 (mod p
k2
2 )
...
x2 ≡ a2r (mod p
kr
r )
Taking the square root of both sides, the following system is
obtained: 
x ≡ ±a1 (mod p
k1
1 )
x ≡ ±a2 (mod p
k2
2 )
...
x ≡ ±ar (mod p
kr
r )
Combining Lemma 3 and Theorem 4, the solutions are:
x ≡ ±a1b1
n
pk11
± a2b2
n
pk22
± · · · ± arbr
n
pkrr
(mod n)
or equivalently, x ≡ xj1,j2,··· ,jr ≡ (−1)
j1 (a1b1 n
p
k1
1
) +
(−1)j2 (a2b2 n
p
k2
2
) + · · · + (−1)jr (arbr npkrr
) (mod n), jl = 0, 1,
for 1 ≤ l ≤ r .
The following new algorithm to compute the square root of
a quadratic residue modulo n = pk11 p
k2
2 · · · p
kr
r is presented
due to the results of Theorem 4. The first algorithm is used to
compute the quadratic residue when x2 ≡ a2 (mod n), where
n = pk11 p
k2
2 · · · p
kr
r . Given the perfect square associated with
the quadratic residue a2 (mod n), which can be determined
using Algorithm 4 in Section III, then the following algo-
rithm enumerates the 2r solutions by reducing the problem
to a calculation of the extended Greatest Common Divisor
(GCD). The extended GCD of two numbers a and b with
gcd(a, b) = g is a solutionm, n ∈ Z to the linear Diophantine
equation ma + nb = g. The extended GCD of r integers,
w1,w2, . . . ,wr is a solution b1, b2, . . . , br ∈ Z that satisfies
the linear Diophantine equation b1w1+b2w2+· · ·+brwr = g.
An algorithm is also presented to compute the extended GCD
of r integers in Algorithm 8 of Section IV.
If only the coefficients are required, then the algorithm runs
in O(rQ(b) + G(b)) time, where Q(b) is the time complexity
required to compute the square root of a quadratic residue
of b bits given by Algorithms 1 - 4 in Section III. If Algo-
rithm 4 is used, then Q(b) = O(log(b)). G(b) is the time
required to compute the Extended GCD of r numbers, for
which the given algorithm runs inO(rM (b)log(b)). Therefore,
the time complexity to generate the terms for the solutions is
O(rM (b)log(b)). However, the time complexity to enumerate
all solutions is O(2r ). To determine the correct plaintext,
padding bits can be used and checked during enumeration.
The output x2r are the 2r solutions to the equation
x2 ≡ a2 (mod n) given by the vector x2r =
(
x0 x1 · · · x2r
)
.
Algorithm 9 is presented to compute all of the 2r solutions
using recursion, which can be easily implemented.
Algorithm 5 can be further generalized for input of
the perfect square associated with each quadratic residue
a21 (mod p
k1
1 ), a
2
2 (mod p
k2
2 ), . . . , a
2
r (mod p
kr
r ), which
can be calculated using Tonelli’s algorithm [10], Cipolla’s
algorithm [12] or the algorithm by exhaustion with no
added condition on the primes, or by using Fermat’s Little
Theorem [13] if the added condition pi ≡ 3 (mod 4) holds
to calculate the perfect squares in mod p1, p2, . . . , pr spaces.
Hensel’s lemma [24] can be applied to lift these solutions to
the mod spaces pk11 , p
k2
2 , . . . , p
kr
r .
Algorithm 5 Decryption Given a2 (mod n)
Input: a2 (mod n) and n = pk11 p
k2
2 · · · p
kr
r
Output: x2r = x1, x2, · · · , x2r solutions to square root
a←±
√
a2
b1, b2, · · · , br ← ExtendedGCD
(
n
p
k1
1
, n
p
k2
2
, · · · , n
pkrr
)
for j← 1 to r do
if gcd(bj, pj) 6= 1 then
5: return -1
end if
end for
return x2r
The output x2r are the 2r solutions to the equation x2 ≡
a2 (mod n).
A complete algorithm to find all 2r solutions is given
in Algorithm 7 that takes any quadratic residue a and r
primes raised to arbitrary powers pk11 , p
k2
2 , . . . , p
kr
r . Vari-
ous choices for implementations of the PerfectSquare and
GenSqrRt functions can be taken. However, for maximum
speed, imposing p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and using Algorithm 4 in
Section III to implement PerfectSquare and using
Algorithm 6 in Section IV to implement GenSqrRt gives
Algorithm 7 and 9 together a O(rM (b)log(b) + 2r ) time
complexity when run together, where r is the number of
primes. When r = 2, this algorithm has O(M (b)log(b))
time complexity which is asymptotically tight to the existing
algorithm for the Rabin cryptosystem.
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Algorithm 6 Generalized Decryption Algorithm
Input: a21 (mod p
k1
1 ), a
2
2 (mod p
k2
2 ), . . . , a
2
r (mod p
kr
r ) perfect
squares of quadratic residues and n = pk11 p
k2
2 · · · p
kr
r
Output: x2r = x1, x2, · · · , x2r solutions to square root
for i← 1 to r do
ai←±
√
a2i
end for
b1, b2, · · · , br ← ExtendedGCD
(
n
p
k1
1
, n
p
k2
2
, · · · , n
pkrr
)
for j← 1 to r do
6: if gcd(bj, pj) 6= 1 then
return -1
end if
end for
return x2r
Algorithm 7 General Rabin Decryption Algorithm
Input: a ∈ Zn and n = pk11 p
k2
2 . . . p
kr
r
Output: x2r = x1, x2, · · · , x2r solutions to square root
for i← 1 to r do
a2i ← PerfectSquare(a, p
ki
i )
end for
x2r ← GenSqrRt(a21, a
2
2, . . . , a
2
r , p
k1
1 , p
k2
2 , . . . , p
kr
r )
return x2r
Using the extended GCD function for two integers
included in the GMP Library which has O(M (b)log(b)) time
complexity [25], where b is the number of bits in the numbers
to multiply andM (b) is the time it takes to multiply two num-
bers of b bits. The ExtendedGCD (Algorithm 8) for r terms is
given by the calculation of r − 1 extended GCD calculations
of two numbers, mpz_gcdext(a, b), in Algorithm 8. This
gives a time complexity for Algorithm 8 as O(rM (b)log(b)).
To solve the ExtendedGCD(w1,w2, . . . ,wr ), Algorithm 8
solves the extended gcd of disjoint pairs of w1,w2, . . . ,wr .
Then the GCD gij of each pair, wi,wj is used as the values
for the next recursive call of ExtendedGCD. In the first
call of ExtendedGCD, r2 extended GCD’s of two numbers
are computed and in the second call r4 are computed. The
algorithm proceeds in this manner until there is only one
value left, which is the GCD of w1,w2, . . . ,wr and this is
the stopping criterion for the function. Therefore, at level i,
we have r2i calls to mpz_gcdext. In sum, a geometric series
is obtained:
∑log2(r)
i=1
r
2i = r
∑log2(r)
i=1
1
2i = r . Since each call
is O(M (b)log(b)), then Algorithm 8 has O(rM (b)log(b)) time
complexity.
In Algorithm 9, an implementation is given to enumerate
all 2r solutions. This algorithm can be used to find x2r in
Algorithms 5 and 6 in O(2r ) time complexity. The algorithm
uses recursion to generate the solutions which builds the
possible combinations for a coefficient of 1 or−1 for the sum
of r terms from the possible combinations for the sum of r−1
terms.
Algorithm 8 ExtendedGCD(w1,w2, . . . ,wr )
Input: b[] coefficients of extended GCD,w[], n size of array,
gcd g
Output: b1, b2, · · · , bi coefficients satisfying b1w1+b2w2+
· · · + brwr = 1
if n < 2 then
b[0]← 1
return
end if
if n (mod 2) = 1 then
s← (n+ 1)/2
else
8: s← n/2
end if
k ← 0
for i← 0 to n− 2 by 2 do
mpz_gcdext(neww[k], b[i], b[i+ 1], w[i], w[i+ 1])
k ← k + 1
end for
if n (mod 2) = 1 then
16: neww[k]← w[n− 1]
b[n− 1]← 1
end if
if n = 2 then
g← neww[k − 1]
end if
ExtendedGCD(g, newb, neww, s)
for i← 0 to s− 1 do
24: b[2i]← b[2i]newb[i]
b[2i+ 1]← b[2i+ 1]newb[i]
end for
if n (mod 2) = 1 then
b[n− 1]← newb[s− 1]
else
b[2(s− 1)]← b[2(s− 1)]newb[s− 1]
b[2(s− 1)+ 1]← b[2(s− 1)+ 1]newb[s− 1]
32: end if
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the security aspect of the proposed algorithm is
discussed. The Rabin cryptosystem relies on the difficulty of
integer factorization; however, only two distinct large primes
are used. The proposed algorithm allows for any fixed num-
ber of primes to be used, and the number can be changed
between sessions allowing for increased unpredictability. The
classical Rabin cryptosystem does not provide ciphertext
indistinguishability. This is because the encryption process
is deterministic. That is, given a public key n, to encrypt
a message m the process follows m2 ≡ c (mod n). If an
eavesdropper knows n and intercepts an encrypted message
c, then to determine if c encodes a potential plaintext message
m̂, then the eavesdropper can perform m̂2 ≡ c1 (mod n).
If c1 = c, then m = m̂ and the plaintext has been recov-
ered. Formally stated, given a message space m ∈ {a, b}
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Algorithm 9 GenerateSolutions
Input: terms of the solutions a[], size of array r
Output: x[] array of 2r solutions
if r = 1 then
x[0]← a[0]
x[1]← a[1]
return x
end if
ry← 1 (r − 1)
y← GenerateSolutions(a, r − 1)
for i← 0 to ry do
9: x[i]← y[i] + a[ry−1]
end for
for i←ry to 2 ∗ ry do
x[i]←−x[i− ry]
end for
return x
and a ciphertext c such that E(m) = c, a ciphertext gives
indistinguishability if an adversary cannot determine which
m ∈ {a, b} encodes c with probabilty greater than 12 . In the
classical Rabin system, an adversary can determine which
plaintext m encodes ciphertext c by encrypting both candi-
dates and choosing the correct plaintext by comparing with
the captured ciphertext.
In the extended Rabin cryptosystem, ciphertext indistin-
guishability can be established. To do this, a random number,
S can be added to the public key and a predetermined number,
z, of least significant bits of the random number, Sz are used
as the padding for the message. This creates a message space
such that the adversary knowing m ∈ {a, b} whereas the
message is really in m ∈ {aSz, bSz}. Since the adversary
does not know S, then they cannot determine a candidate
message from only {a, b}. The public key can be extended
using two large primes, p and q, and a random number S
such that n = pqS. To generate S, each participant in the
encryption agrees on a shared secret seed, s0 and a pseudo
random number generator f . Then, eachmessage is sent using
a new key derived from p, q, and s0. The first message can be
encrypted with S = s1 = f (s0) and n1 = pqs1, and the ith
message can be encrypted with si = f (si−1) and ni = pqsi.
In this way, the keys n1, n2, ... do not have to be shared for
subsequent encryptions. Therefore, an outside eavesdropper
who intercepts the ith ciphertext, ci does not know ni = pqsi.
Since si is unknown then the z least significant bits s
z
i are
also unknown. Therefore, the eavesdropper cannot determine
what padding to append to the candidate messages. However,
since the two intended parties both know the initial seed s0
and the function f , both intended parties know ni for each
message since the sequence s1, s2, . . . is deterministic given
s0. The observation that any given random number si has a
prime factorization, si = p
ksi1
si1
p
ksi2
si2
· · · p
ksir
sir , then ni = pqsi =
pqp
ksi1
si1
p
ksi2
si2
· · · p
ksir
sir . Therefore, the proposed algorithms in
Section IV can be used to decrypt a ciphertext ci with key ni.
Given a public key n = pq and shared secret (s0, f ), and
a message space m ∈ {a, b}. Alice sends Bob an encrypted
message ci by computing si = f (si−1), constructing the key
ni = pqsi, and encrypts the plaintext mi with appended
padding bits szi using m
2
i ≡ ci (mod ni). Bob computes si
and ni independently of Alice using the same scheme, so ni
is not sent across the public channel. Then an adversary who
knows n and intercepts a ciphertext corresponding to the ith
encryption, ci, cannot determine mi by encrypting candidate
messages m̂ by m̂ ≡ ĉ (mod n) and comparing ĉ to ci because
ci was not encrypted using the public key n and the message
m was appended with padding bits chosen from si. Since the
choice of si is random, it is infeasible for the adversary to
guess the key ni even if n is known. It is similarly infeasible
for the adversary to determine the padding used szi for the
message mi since as long as z is greater than one, there are
more than two choices for szi .
VI. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section, experimental evaluation is presented for the
algorithms given in Section IV. The proposed algorithms
are applied to the Rabin cryptosystem for its direct corre-
spondence to the quadratic residue problem. For the exper-
iments herein using Algorithm 7, the PerfectSquare function
is implemented using Fermat’s Little Theorem, Algorithm 4
in Section III. The GenSqrRt function is implemented using
Algorithm 6 from Section IV. Three experiments are con-
ducted. In the first experiment, n = pq is fixed for a direct
comparison with the proposed algorithm and the existing
algorithm used to decrypt ciphertexts in the Rabin cryp-
tosystem. The existing algorithm is derived from the classi-
cal Chinese Remainder Theorem (Theorem 1). The second
experiment uses two primes and varies the number of bits in
the prime to compare the runtime of our algorithm with the
existing algorithm used to decrypt ciphertexts in the Rabin
cryptosystem. Finally, the third experiment shows the run
time of Algorithm 6 from Section IV as a function of the
number of primes in the prime factorization of n.
A. SPECIFICATIONS
All of the algorithms for our experiments are implemented
in C++11 using the g++ compiler version 7.3.0. For all of
the tests, the −O3 flag is used for compiler optimizations.
Due to the size of the integers in the calculations, the GNU
MP Bignum Library (GMP) is used for integers with arbi-
trary precision [25]. To capture the run time of each test,
the C++11 Chrono library’s high resolution clock is used.
The experiments were run in a 64-bit Ubuntu 18.04 LTS
virtual machine on a Windows 10.0.17134 host operating
system using VirtualBox 6.0.4 r128413 (Qt5.6.2). The vir-
tual machine is allocated 2 hardware cores (4 logical) and
40,000 MB of RAM with VT-x/AMD-V, nested paging, and
KVM paravirtualization. The host computer used to run the
tests consists of a Intel Xeon E5-1630 v4 running at 3.70 GHz
with 4 physical cores and 8 logical processors and 64 GB of
RAM.
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FIGURE 1. Average run-time of 10 trials with varying size of plaintext shows the proposed method is competitive to the existing
method when n = pq.
B. DATA DESCRIPTION
The six data sets used for the verification of the proposed
method were obtained from UCI Machine Learning Repos-
itory [26]. The size of the data sets ranges from 6.2 KB to
4.0 MB. The different sizes of the data sets are chosen to
demonstrate the performance of the algorithm under different
circumstances. For example, one could apply the proposed
algorithm to encrypt symmetric keys. The type and content
of the data sets are not important to the encryption-decryption
process.
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FIGURE 2. Average run time of 10 trials with varying key size shows the proposed method is competitive when n = pq.
The Balance Scale data (balance-scale) set is the small-
est data set that is tested in our experiments contain-
ing 6250 bytes of character encoded data. It consists
of 625 instances of four attributes used to classify a scale
as balanced, tipped to the right, or tipped to the left. The
Computer Hardware data set (machine) contains 8726 bytes
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TABLE 1. Performance comparison in microseconds highlights the superiority of the proposed method.
of character encoded data. It consists of 209 instances of nine
attributes to describe the relative performance of CPU chips.
The Car Evaluation data (car) set contains 51867 bytes of
character encoded data. It consists of 1728 instances of 6
attributes to evaluate various models of cars. The Chess Data
Set (krkopt) consists of 531,806 character encoded bytes. The
data set consists of 28,056 instances of 6 classifying attributes
to evaluate common chess endgame position consisting of a
white king and rook against a lone black king. The Anony-
mous Microsoft Web Data data set (anonymous-msweb) is a
large data set of 1,423,098 character encoded bytes. The data
set is 37,711 instances of 294 attributes compiled from user
visits to the www.microsoft.com website. Finally, the Adult
data set (adult) is the largest data set that is tested containing
3,974,305 character bytes. The data set is 48,842 instances
of 14 attributes to classify the income brackets from census
information. The data sets were chosen for their varying sizes,
accessibility, and ease of use, rather than their application to
machine learning. Each data set contains several character
strings that are repeated. However, blocks of the plaintext
relative to the key size are encrypted. Since the block size
is larger than a single word, it is unlikely for two blocks to be
exactly the same in the experiments.
C. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experiments block the large data sets into chunks. The
block size is proportional to the key size and is small enough
to avoid degenerate cases during encryption. The data sets
were chosen in order to show clear trends in the algorithm’s
performance, rather than the application to encrypting sym-
metric keys. A degenerate case during encryption is one
where two or more plaintexts map to the same cipher text.
Both algorithms used the same encryption process.
Figures 1a-1f correspond to the first experiment and plot
the average run-time in microseconds of each algorithm to
the percentage of the data set encrypted. The data sets show
that the proposed algorithm grows linearly with respect to
the size of the plaintext. Fig. 1a shows the proposed algo-
rithm performs better than the Fermat’s method by about
28%. Fig. 1e shows the proposed algorithm has about the
same run-time as Fermat’s method. Fig. 1f is the only trial
FIGURE 3. The average run time is not greatly affected with less than
9 primes in the factorization of n.
where the proposed algorithm did not perform better than
the existing method. The data set used in Fig. 1f is relatively
small, so the overhead associatedwith the proposed algorithm
may have contributed to the slower performance. However,
in larger data sets, this overhead is minimal. The results are
displayed in Table 1 with the superior results shown in bold
for increased clarity. It is shown that the proposed algorithm
can provide a similar speed across a variety of data set sizes
to the existing algorithm, while expanding the cryptosystem
to allow an unlimited number of primes.
Figures 2a-2f correspond to the second experiment, where
the proposed algorithm is tested against Fermat’s method
with varying public key size. The experiment shows that
the proposed algorithm has similar time complexity to the
existing two prime algorithm for the Rabin cryptosystem
independent of the key size. The experimental results for the
proposed algorithm are consistent with the existing methods.
Figure 3a corresponds to the final experiment, where the
proposed algorithm is tested with the public key composed of
different number of primes. It is demonstrated in this experi-
ment that the Rabin cryptosystem can be extended to provide
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an unlimited number of primes to construct the shared public
key. In the experiment, the size of each prime is 512 bits.
Figure 3a demonstrates that using eight or less primes in
the prime factorization of the public key yields a negligible
trade off in performance. Therefore, the proposed algorithm
for indistinguishability given in Section V can be constructed
with a random number s of no more than 4096 bits from
8 primes with 512 bits per prime, which represents a num-
ber in the range of [0, 24096 − 1]. Therefore, this approach
maintains the efficiency of the unmodified extended Rabin
cryptosystem. The graph is exponential in the number of
primes due to the algorithm used to generate the 2r solutions
to the quadratic residue problem with r primes. The proposed
algorithm used to enumerate the solutions runs inO(2r ) time;
however, an algorithm with polynomial time complexity can
be implemented using a dynamic programming technique.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a number of theorems and algorithms
for the Chinese Remainder Theorem and the extended Rabin
cryptosystem. The experimental analysis of the proposed
algorithms being applied to Rabin cryptosystem shows a
performance improvement compared with the existing algo-
rithm for Rabin cryptosystem. The proposed algorithms also
add support for encryption on any ring of integers modulo
n with an arbitrary number of distinct primes in its prime
factorization while retaining the elegance of a solution using
only two primes. It was shown how this increase in generality
can be used to provide ciphertext indistinguishability to the
extended Rabin cryptosystem. Furthermore, by increasing
the key size, a larger message space can be constructed to
increase the size of the plaintext blocks. This can be used to
reduce the fragmentation of large plaintexts which incur an
increased number of decryptions in smaller message spaces.
The algorithm to enumerate all 2r solutions with polynomial
time complexity is left as future work.
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A
This proof is in Kumanduri and Romero’s book [22].
Theorem 1 (Classical Chinese Remainder Theorem): Let
m1,m2, ...,mr be pairwise relatively prime integers. Then the
simultaneous congruence
x ≡ a1 (mod m1)
x ≡ a2 (mod m2)
...
x ≡ ar (mod mr )
(1.1)
has a unique solution modulo the product M = m1 × m2 ×
· · · × mr . Proof: Let Mi = M/mi. Since the mi’s are
pairwise relatively prime, mi, so it has an inverse xi modulo
mi; that is, Mixi ≡ 1 (mod mi). If i 6= j, then mi | Mj; that is,
Mj ≡ 0 (mod mi). Then
x ≡ a1 M1 x1 + a2 M2 x2 + · · · + arMrxr (mod M )
is a solution to the system because
a1 M1 x1 + a2 M2 x2 + · · · + arMrxr ≡ aiMixi (mod mi)
≡ ai · 1 (mod mi)
≡ ai (mod mi)
This proves the existence. For the uniqueness property of the
solution:
Suppose x and y are two distinct solutions. Now x ≡
y (modmi) for each i; that is,mi | (x−y). Themi are pairwise
relatively prime; hence, by unique factorization, the product
m1m2 · · ·mr | (x − y); that is, x ≡ y (mod m1 · · ·mr ). This
proves the uniqueness.
APPENDIX B
This proof is in Nagasaka et al.’s paper [23]. Theorem 2
(Improved Algorithm) Under the same assumptions as in
the Chinese Remainder Theorem (Theorem 1), the system of
congruences (1.1) is equivalent to the following single linear
congruence.
(
k∑
i=1
biMi)x ≡
k∑
i=1
aibiMi (mod M ) (1.2)
where bi’s are arbitrary integers coprime tomi’s, respectively,
and Mi = M/mi for i = 1, 2, . . . , k with
M =
k∏
i=1
mi
To prove this theorem, the following two lemmas are
required.
Lemma 1: The system of congruences (1.1) is equivalent
to the following system of congruences:
M1x ≡ a1M1 (mod M )
M2x ≡ a2M2 (mod M )
...
Mk−1x ≡ ak−1Mk−1 (mod M )
k∑
i=1
biMix ≡
∑k
i=1 aibiMi (mod M ),
(1.3)
where bi is relatively prime to mi for i = 1, 2, · · · , r .
Proof: The necessity is shown as follows. Suppose x is
a solution of (1.1). Then, for i = 1, 2, · · · , k ,
x − ai = cimi,
with an integer ci. Multiplying the above identity withMi for
each i, we get for i = 1, · · · , k ,
Mix −Miai = cimiMi = ciM ,
which is rewritten as the congruence
Mix ≡ Miai (mod M ) (1.4)
for i = 1, 2, · · · , k . The first k − 1 congruences in (1.3) are
identical with those of (1.4) for i = 1, 2, · · · , k − 1. The last
congruence of (1.3) can be obtained as a linear combination
of (1.4).
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Conversely, we assume that x is a solution of the system
of congruences. Since Mi and mi are coprime, (1.4) can be
reduced to
x ≡ ai (mod mi),
for i = 1, 2, · · · , k − 1.
Subtracting the linear combination of the first k − 1 con-
gruences in (1.3), we have
bkMkx ≡ akbkMk (mod M ).
SinceMk and bk are relatively prime to mk , we conclude that
x ≡ ak (mod mk )
This concludes the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2:Under the same assumption as in Theorem III.2,
M is relatively prime to
k∑
i=1
biMi.
Proof. Let g be the GCD of
k∑
i=1
biMi and M and let p be
a prime factor of g. Then p divides
k∑
i=1
biMi and M =
k∑
i=1
mi.
The divisibility of M by p implies that p divides only one of
mi, say mj, since gcd(mi,mj) = 1 if i 6= j. Then p divides all
Mi butMj, sinceMj = M/mj. Together with the divisibility of
k∑
i=1
biMi by p, we derive that p divides bjMj and consequently
divides bj. Hence p divides the GCD of mj and bj which is
equal to one from the assumption.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Theorem 1: By Lemma 1, we know that the
system of congruences (1.1) is equivalent to the system (1.3).
From Lemma 2, the last congruence has a unique solution,
say x0 (mod M ). Thus the system (1.3) has a unique solu-
tion x0, which implies that x0 is the unique solution of the
system of congruences (1.1), since the Chinese Remainder
Theorem assures the unique existence of the solution of the
system (1.1) (mod M ).
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